United States: Tax Court holds that relevancy determination is required to apply Section 7701(o)

Tax News and Developments December 2025

In brief

In Patel v. Commissioner,1 the United States Tax Court, by unanimous decision, held that the economic substance doctrine, as codified by section 7701(o), imposes a threshold relevancy requirement. The Tax Court relied on traditional tools of statutory construction and determined that “Congress could hardly have been clearer” in the statutory text, which requires “right there, on its face” a relevancy determination.


Contents

Background

After previously disallowing deductions under section 162 for amounts paid by the taxpayers to purported captive insurance companies,2 the Tax Court in Patel considered whether the taxpayers were liable for penalties under section 6662(b)(6) for underpayments of tax attributable to transactions that the IRS claimed were lacking economic substance under section 7701(o), as well as an increased penalty under section 6662(i) for inadequately disclosing such transactions. Because its prior decision regarding the deductibility of the payments did not address whether the transactions lacked economic substance, the Tax Court began its analysis with section 7701(o). At issue was whether section 7701(o) required the Tax Court to first determine the economic substance doctrine was relevant to the taxpayers’ transactions before proceeding with the two-part test imposed by sections 7701(o)(1)(A) and (B).

Section 7701(o) imposes a threshold relevancy requirement

The Tax Court’s analysis centered on the statutory text of section 7701(o). The Tax Court explained that the opening text of section 7701(o)(1) states it applies to any “transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant.” Additionally, the Tax Court observed that section 7701(o)(5), in turn, “expressly directs” courts to determine whether the doctrine is relevant, and “if that were not enough, the same provision explains how to make the determination.” Based on the statute’s plain language, the Tax Court “easily” concluded section 7701(o) “requires a relevancy determination” and looked to legislative history only to confirm its consistency with the Tax Court’s interpretation.

In reaching its conclusion, the Tax Court expressly disagreed with the decisions in Liberty Global, Inc. v. United States3—currently on appeal before the Tenth Circuit—and Chemoil Corp. v. United States4 and held the relevancy requirement is not co-extensive with the two-part (objective and subjective) test imposed by sections 7701(o)(1)(A) and (B). Rather, the Tax Court reasoned that “[c]onflating the relevancy determination with the two-part test would … deprive the statute's reference to relevance of independent meaning” contrary to the Tax Court’s duty to avoid surplusage.

The Tax Court next considered the content of the relevancy requirement, concluding Congress answered this question when it directed courts under section 7701(o)(5) to determine whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant “as if [the statute] had never been enacted.” Operating within the bounds of pre-codification economic substance doctrine cases similarly involving insurance transactions, the Tax Court concluded the doctrine was relevant in Patel without articulating a comprehensive standard for cases with facts not as readily traceable to common law. In doing so, the Tax Court emphasized the “parallels” between the Patels’ case and the precedent set by Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner,5 noting it “perceive[d] no mitigating factors . . . that would argue for a different approach from the one [courts] have previously taken.”

Notably, the Tax Court considered and quickly dismissed the taxpayers’ argument that the economic substance doctrine does not apply where the taxpayer is “Congressionally induced” or “Congressionally incentivized” to engage in the transaction at issue. The Tax Court reasoned this argument fails for two reasons: (i) the economic substance doctrine applies to insurance arrangements (i.e., it is relevant), and (ii) the taxpayers could not identify any congressional inducement in this instance to claim deductions “for purported insurance that is not, in fact, insurance.”6 The Tax Court then applied the two-part test of section 7701(o)(1)(A) and (B) to conclude that the transactions lacked economic substance.

Section 6662(b)(6) imposes a 20% penalty, and section 6662(i) permits a penalty increase when a transaction is not adequately disclosed

After concluding the transactions lacked economic substance, the Tax Court confirmed a 20% penalty under section 6662(b)(6) applies if the “lack of economic substance” is “the cause of the disallowance of the claimed tax benefit.” Section 6662(i) increases the section 6662(b)(6) penalty to 40% for any portion of the underpayment attributable to one or more inadequately disclosed noneconomic substance transactions. The Court acknowledged that this was the first time it has been asked to consider what constitutes adequate disclosure under section 6662(i)(2). It recognized that, in other contexts, adequacy is a “factual question” and, for a disclosure to be adequate, the taxpayer’s return or statement to their return must provide the IRS sufficient information “to alert the Commissioner and his agents as to the nature of the transaction” so that they can make a “reasonably informed” decision as to whether to audit the return. The Court determined that there was no adequate disclosure here because the taxpayers “did not attach a statement to their returns, nor did they adequately disclose the relevant facts or provide sufficient information on their returns to enable respondent to identify the potential controversy involved.” The Tax Court did not accept the taxpayers’ penalty defenses as they did not have substantial authority, or act with reasonable cause and in good faith, for the positions they took, and the Tax Court sustained the increased penalty under section 6662(i).

The implications

Although the taxpayers in Patel were unsuccessful in challenging the penalties, the Tax Court confirmed that section 7701(o) includes a threshold relevancy requirement, which provides taxpayers a valuable tool for challenging applications of the economic substance doctrine to transactions—especially those transactions that have not been analyzed under the economic substance doctrine framework at common law. Moreover, the Tax Court’s imposition of the section 6662(i) penalty increase underscores the importance of providing sufficient disclosures either in the taxpayer’s return or attached thereto.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Liberty Global may address some of the same issues raised in Patel (including the threshold relevancy requirement) and will be one to watch.
 


1 165 T.C. No. 10 (2025).

2 See Patel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-34

3 1:20-cv-03501-RBJ (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2023). See our previous client alert discussing Liberty Global, United States: Courts show changing attitudes towards anti-abuse doctrines - Baker McKenzie InsightPlus.

4 No. 19-CV-6314-LTS-JW (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023).

5 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995).

6 The Tax Court previously held the amounts paid by the taxpayers to purported captive insurance companies were not insurance premiums for federal income tax purposes and, thus, not deductible under section 162. See Patel v.. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2024-34.

Contact Information

Copyright © 2025 Baker & McKenzie. All rights reserved. Ownership: This documentation and content (Content) is a proprietary resource owned exclusively by Baker McKenzie (meaning Baker & McKenzie International and its member firms). The Content is protected under international copyright conventions. Use of this Content does not of itself create a contractual relationship, nor any attorney/client relationship, between Baker McKenzie and any person. Non-reliance and exclusion: All Content is for informational purposes only and may not reflect the most current legal and regulatory developments. All summaries of the laws, regulations and practice are subject to change. The Content is not offered as legal or professional advice for any specific matter. It is not intended to be a substitute for reference to (and compliance with) the detailed provisions of applicable laws, rules, regulations or forms. Legal advice should always be sought before taking any action or refraining from taking any action based on any Content. Baker McKenzie and the editors and the contributing authors do not guarantee the accuracy of the Content and expressly disclaim any and all liability to any person in respect of the consequences of anything done or permitted to be done or omitted to be done wholly or partly in reliance upon the whole or any part of the Content. The Content may contain links to external websites and external websites may link to the Content. Baker McKenzie is not responsible for the content or operation of any such external sites and disclaims all liability, howsoever occurring, in respect of the content or operation of any such external websites. Attorney Advertising: This Content may qualify as “Attorney Advertising” requiring notice in some jurisdictions. To the extent that this Content may qualify as Attorney Advertising, PRIOR RESULTS DO NOT GUARANTEE A SIMILAR OUTCOME. Reproduction: Reproduction of reasonable portions of the Content is permitted provided that (i) such reproductions are made available free of charge and for non-commercial purposes, (ii) such reproductions are properly attributed to Baker McKenzie, (iii) the portion of the Content being reproduced is not altered or made available in a manner that modifies the Content or presents the Content being reproduced in a false light and (iv) notice is made to the disclaimers included on the Content. The permission to re-copy does not allow for incorporation of any substantial portion of the Content in any work or publication, whether in hard copy, electronic or any other form or for commercial purposes.